Guessing probability is a very important security criterion in practical quantum cryptography. We present a simple and efficient method to calculate the upper bound of the guessing probability tightly. The guessing probability of k can be upper bounded by the guessing probability of k ′ , where k ′ can be mapped from k. Comparing with the known methods, our result is more tightened by thousands of magnitude orders. For example, given a 10 −9 -secure key from the sifted key, the upper bound of the guessing probability is 2 × 10 −3277 using our method. This value is smaller than the existing result 10 −9 by more than 3000 magnitude orders.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol was proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 , based on the fundamentals of quantum mechanics [1] . Since then, the security of QKD has always been a hot issue in the quantum cryptographic field [2, 3] . In a practical cryptosystem, the impact of guessing probability on security is very important. However, there are few studies on the guessing probability of QKD. The existing prior art results only gave a very loose upper bound for the guessing probability [4, 5] . For example, according to the existing result, the guessing probability of an ε-secure key is about 10 −9 if ε is around 10 −9 . But in practice, it is not unusual that we need the guessing probability to be much smaller such as 10 −100 or 10 −1000 . Therefore, it is extremely important to find a more tightened upper bound of guessing probability.
In this letter, starting from the existing security criterion, we will give a very efficient and simple method to evaluate the guessing probability. Typically, compared with those previous results, the method proposed here can reduce by hundreds or even thousands of orders of magnitude for the upper bound value of the guessing probability.
This letter is organized as follows. First, with some lemmas and theorems, we propose a simple and efficient method to calculate the guessing probability. We then present numerical results under typical conditions. In particular, given a 10 −9 -secure key from the sifted key, our method upper bounds the guessing probability at 10 −3277 , which is smaller than the existing result of 10 −9 by thousands of magnitude orders. In the discussion part, we point out some errors in an earlier literature [2] . And we conclude that logically the loosen bound of guessing probability cannot be regarded as evidence to question the validity of existing QKD theory.
II. THE GUESSING PROBABILITY
We consider the security definitions of a practical QKD protocol with finite-size under the framework of composable security [4, [6] [7] [8] . Suppose that Alice and Bob get two N -bit sifted key strings, s and s ′ . By performing an error correction and private amplification scheme, Alice gets a n 1 -bit key k and Bob gets an estimate keyk of k from s and s ′ . The protocol is ε cor -correct if P [k =k] ≤ ε cor . In general, the key k of Alice can be correlated with an eavesdropper system and the density matrix of Alice and Eve is ρ AE . The protocol outputs an ε-secure key [9] , if
where 1 denotes the trace norm, ρ U is the fully mixed state of Alice's system. The protocol is ε tol -secure if ε cor and ε satisfies ε cor + ε ≤ ε tol which means it is ε tolindistinguishable from a ideal protocol. Without any loss of generality, we consider the case of ε cor = ε in this article.
We define the security level: Definition 1 If key k is ε-secure, we also say the security level of key k is ε.
For symbol clarity, we shall use notation ε k for the security level of key k. With this definition, we shall say key k is ε k -secure, or its security level is ε k .
We define the guessing probability: Definition 2 For Alice's key k, we define Eve's probability of correctly obtaining k as the guessing probability of k, and denote as p(k).
Lemma 1 The guessing probability of an ε k -secure key k with length n 1 is not larger than 1 2 n 1 + ε k .
This Lemma has been mentioned in Ref. [5] , here we give a simple proof.
Proof. Let n-bit string x be the ε x -secure key in X . And the density matrix of Alice and Eve is ρ XE and satisfies
where ρ Ux is the fully mixed state in X . Then we have
Eve's guessing probability of string x is q(x), and the maximum guessing probability is p guessing = max x∈X {q(x)}. Without any loss of generality, assuming that the maximum guessing probability is q(x ′ ). Note that x∈X q(x) = 1, then the following holds
From the Eqs.(2)-(4), we have p guessing ≤ 2 −n1 + ε x , and thus for the n 1 -bit ε k -secure key k, the guessing probability satisfies
wherep(k) is the upper bound of p(k). This ends our proof of Lemma 1. Note that, though Lemma 1 makes an upper bound for p(k), we do not simply use this formula alone to get the upper bound of the guessing probability. Because this formula alone cannot lead to a satisfactory result in practical situations. For example, it is not unusual in practice that we need to set the guessing probability to be 10 −100 or even much smaller, 10 −1000 . In such cases, if only using Lemma 1, the security level ε has to be set very small and the key length will be reduced drastically. Fortunately, we have a much better way for tightening the bound. That is what we shall present in the following.
Lemma 2
If key k can be mapped to string k ′ by a map M that is known to Eve, then the guessing probability of k cannot be larger than the guessing probability of string k ′ i.e.,
Here p(k), p(k ′ ) are guessing probabilities of k and k ′ , respectively.
Proof. This lemma is obvious, just because when Eve can correctly guess the k, Eve can obtain the k ′ definitely due to knowing the map M . Otherwise, Eve can still correctly guess the k ′ with a probability not less than 0, i.e. p(k ′ ) = p(k) + δ, δ ≥ 0.
Theorem 1: If an ε k -secure key k with length n 1 can be mapped to an ε k ′ -secure key k ′ with length n 2 , the guessing probability of k cannot be larger than k ′ , i.e.
Proof. This theorem actually requests two conditions: i) the final key k can be mapped to the string k ′ , ii) the string k ′ can be regarded as a ε k ′ -secure key.
With these two conditions, the proof is very simple. Given the condition i), we can apply Lemma 2 to obtain
Given the condition ii), we can apply Lemma 1 to obtain
And according to Eqs. (8) and (9), we can obtain
This ends our proof of Theorem 1.
III. METHOD
With Theorem 1, it is now possible for us to get the upper bound of the guessing probability of an ε k -secure key k much tightly. Instead of directly applying Lemma 1, we choose to first map k to a n 2 -bit string k ′ = M (k). If string k ′ itself can be regarded as an ε k ′ -secure final key, we can apply Theorem 1 now through calculatinḡ p(k ′ ). And we can obtain a much smaller upper bound of the guessing probability of k if ε k ′ is very small and n 2 is not too small. Now the problems remaining for us is what is the map M , and how to make sure that k ′ = M (k) is another key which is ε k ′ -secure, and how to calculate ε k ′ . We start our method with the hashing function in the key distillation.
Our hashing function. We take the key distillation with the random matrix. Denote R nN as the n × N random matrix with each element being either 0 or 1, randomly. Also, we represent the N -bit sifted string s by a column vector S which contains N elements. To obtain a n-bit final key, we simply take the calculation R nN S. As one may check it easily here that our random matrix is a class of two-universal hashing function family [3] .
Suppose we have distilled out the n 1 -bit key k from the N -bit sifted key s through hashing by our random matrix R n1N . We can map the n 1 -bit key k into the n 2bit string k ′ = M (k) simply by deleting the last n 1 − n 2 bits from key string k. Obviously, this string k ′ mapped from k can also be regarded as another final key distilled from sift key S by the n 2 × N random hashing matrix R n2N , which is a submatrix of R n1N . In summary, we have
This means, on the one hand, k ′ is a string mapped from key k. And on the other hand, k ′ can be regarded as another final key of length n 2 distilled from sifted key s. Since the two conditions in Theorem 1 are satisfied, according to Theorem 1, we can get a tightened upper bound of p(k) with Eq. (7), if we know the security level of key k ′ , i.e., the value of ε k ′ . Since our random matrix is a class of two-universal hashing function, the value ε k ′ is dependent on n 2 [4] . Details are shown in the supplement on the calculation of ε k ′ given n 2 . Hence, in a QKD protocol using random hashing matrix presented here, to get the upper bound of the guessing probability of the n 1bit final key k, we can summarize the procedure above by the following scheme:
Scheme 1) Given the n 1 -bit final key k, we delete its last n 1 − n 2 bits and obtain string k ′ . 2) We regard k ′ as another possible final key which is ε k ′ -secure. Compute the ε k ′ value of k ′ with the input parameters N and n 2 .
3) Calculatep(k) by Theorem 1 through Eq. (7) .
Since in our scheme, the value of ε k ′ is dependent on n 2 as shown in the supplement, we can now replace ε k ′ by a functional form, ε k ′ (n 2 ). To obtain a tightened upper bound value of the guessing probability in scheme 1, we need to choose an appropriate n 2 value. In our calculation, we set the condition
for the appropriate n 2 . Once we find the value n 2 and the corresponding ε k ′ (n 2 ), we calculatep(k ′ ) by Eq. (7) . Obviously, this is the upper bound of guessing probability of all those final key k of length n 1 provided that n 1 > n 2 .
(13)
Thus we can actually use a more efficient scheme to get the upper bound of the guessing probability of key k, as the following Theorem 2: Theorem 2: In a QKD protocol, if the n 1 -bit final key k is distilled by using random matrix R n1N , the guessing probability of k can be upper bounded by
where n 2 satisfies 2 −n2 = ε k ′ (n 2 ), n 2 ≤ n 1 . 14% is the channel error tolerance, Nz = 0.22N tol is the length of string used to do parameter estimation, the length of sifted key is N = 0.78N tol , N tol is the total length of sifted key and the string used to do parameter estimation, ε = 10 −9 , n is the length of 10 −9 -secure key, and pguessing is the probability that correctly guess the final key. In particular, p T hm.2 guessing is the result of Theorem 2 of this work. Table. I describes the upper bounds of the guessing probability calculated by different N tol , where N tol is the length of total string that includes the sifted keys and the string used to do parameter estimation. In Table. I, N tol = 10 4 , 10 5 , 10 6 respectively. We can see from the Table. I that when N tol = 10 6 , n = 4.90 × 10 5 and the guessing probabilities obtained using the methods of [2] and [5] are about 10 −6 and 10 −9 respectively. However, using our method the guessing probability can be reduced to 2 × 10 −3277 which is more tightened by thousands of magnitude orders than prior art methods. As the length of N tol increases, the length of final key also increases, but the guessing probabilities in [2] and [5] almost remain unchanged. Compared with [2] and [5] , the guessing probability obtained by our method is significantly reduced, which is more realistic and tighter. It should be noted that we calculate the case without the KPA in Table. I. Now we consider the case of KPA in QKD with our method. Suppose Eve has known t bits of the final n 2 -bit key k ′ , the guessing probability of an ε k ′ -secure key k ′ is p KP A (k ′ ) ≤ 2 −(n2−t−1) . The upper bound of guessing probability of key k ′ now is equal to that of an ideal (n 2 − t − 1)-bit key.
IV. DISCUSSION
Earlier, some loose upper bound for the guessing probability was obtained in [2] . For example, they present a numerical result of 10 −3 10 −6 of the guessing probability for the case with (without) know-plaintext attack (KPA) where key is 10 −9 -secure (It seems that Yuen [2] wrongly thought the total number of effective events in [4] as the length of the final key). However, the result there [2] is not at all tight. In Table. I, we find that even we set N tol = 10 5 , the upper bound of the guessing probability is 2 × 10 −327 which is more tightened by hundreds of magnitude orders. We emphasize that the loose upper bound in [2] does not in any sense make an evidence for questioning the validity of the existing security proof of QKD, even though the upper bound values there are quite large. Note that, if one does not make any effort, one can also conclude an upper bound value of 100% for the guessing probability, this value is very large and definitely correct. However, this can not make an evidence for questioning the existing security proofs.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we focus on tightening the upper bound of the guessing probability of QKD. Based on the existing secure criterion and a general property of guessing probability, we propose a simple and efficient method to calculate the upper bound of the guessing probability. We find that the guessing probability p(k) of k can be upper bounded by 2 −(n2−1) , where n 2 satisfies 2 −n2 = ε k ′ (n 2 ) and n 2 ≤ n 1 . In particular, a simple random matrix R nN can be used to distill the final key. Comparing with prior art results, of which the upper bound of the guessing probability of an ε-secure key is about ε, our method gives a more tightened upper bound. In addition, we point out some logical errors in Ref. [2] . The result of Ref. [2] cannot be regarded as evidence to question the validity of existing the security proof of QKD.
Supplemental material
We consider the security definitions of a practical QKD protocol with finite-size under the framework of composable security [1] [2] [3] [4] . Suppose that Alice and Bob get two N -bit sifted key strings. By performing an error correction and private amplification scheme, Alice get a n-bit final key k and Bob get an estimatek of k. The protocol is ε cor -correct if P [k =k] ≤ ε cor . In general, the key k of Alice can be correlated with an eavesdropper system and the density matrix of Alice and Eve is ρ AE The protocol outputs an ε k -secure key, if
where 1 denotes the trace norm, ρ U is the fully mixed state of Alice's system. The protocol is ε tol -secure if ε cor and ε k satisfies ε cor + ε k ≤ ε tol which means it is ε tol -indistinguishable from a ideal protocol. Without any loss of generality, we consider the case of ε cor = ε k .
From Lemma 1, we can calculatep(k) given the n-bit ε k -secure key k. In this situation,p(k) = 2 −n + ε k . However, in our method with random matrix R, we only know N , the length of sifted key and n 2 , the length of string k ′ mapped from k. String k ′ itself can also be regarded as another final key distilled from sifted key. According to Ref. [3] , with N and n 2 , the final key is ε k ′ -secure if ε k ′ satisfies the following equation:
where µ = N +Nz N Nz
Nz+1
Nz ln 2 ε k ′ , N z is the length of string used for parameter estimation, h denotes the binary Shannon entropy function, h(x) = −x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x) and Q tol represents the channel error tolerance. To obtain non-trivial results, we take equality in Eq. (2) to calculate the value of ε k ′ , given the input n 2 . Since ε k ′ is dependent on n 2 , we use notation ε k ′ (n 2 ) for ε k ′ . Here, ε k ′ (n 2 ) means, given n 2 , we find the value of ε k ′ numerically by Eq. (2) In our calculation, we choose specific n 2 -value that satisfies 2 −n2 = ε k ′ (n 2 ).
Combining Eq. (2),we obtain the following equation for a tightened ε k ′ value:
and we can calculate the value of ε k ′ and then calculate the guessing probability by Eq. (8) in our main body text.
